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Abstract—In Software Defined Network (SDN), the networks 
are vulnerable to attacks by compromised switches, since it often 
used programmable software switches are vulnerable than 
traditional hardware switches. Although several 
countermeasures against compromised switches have been 
proposed, the accuracy of detecting malicious behavior depends 
on the performance of network statistics gathering by a 
controller. In this paper, we propose an approach to verify the 
consistency of forwarding state using simultaneously network 
statistics gathering from the switch by accurate time scheduling. 
Our method enables to detect attacks by compromised switches 
without being influenced by the performance of statistics 
gathering by the controller. Our method utilizes moving average 
thus our method mitigates the effect on the verification accuracy 
from the impact of switches performance such as the error of 
scheduling. In addition, we implemented the proposed method 
with Mininet, and we confirmed that our method is able to verify 
without depending on the performance of statistic-gathering by 
the controller. 
 
Index Terms—SDN (Software Defined Network), Scheduled 
Bundle, Statistics Gathering, PTP (Precision Time Protocol). 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
INCE attackers may compromise switches by abusing 
software or hardware vulnerabilities, networks are 
vulnerable to attacks by compromised switches. In particular, 
several papers indicate that Software Defined Network (SDN) 
is often used programmable software switches, and increase 
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the probability of compromise than traditional hardware 
switches [1], [2], [3]. For instance, CVE-2016-2074[4] 
reports that attacker can execute arbitrary code with abusing 
the vulnerability of buffer overflow in Open vSwitch. Thus, 
protection of SDN data plane is more important than 
traditional networks. 
Byte consistency check, which was proposed in 
SPHINX[2], is a countermeasure against suspicious behaviors 
by compromised switches such as packet dropping and 
injection. However, it has an issue that the verification 
accuracy depends on the performance of statistics gathering 
of a controller. Moreover, an alternative solution based on 
trajectory sampling called WedgeTail [3] has proposed 
recently. Although WedgeTail can be verified with higher 
accuracy than SPHINX, it requires more resources to perform 
verification. 
In the field of flow updating in SDN, Time 4 [5] was 
proposed as a method to update the flow simultaneously using 
Scheduled Bundle. Scheduled Bundle is a method to schedule 
the timing of executing OpenFlow messages at switches. 
Time4 showed that updating flow at the same time with 
Scheduled Bundle can suppress packet loss and without the 
performance degradation at Flow Swapping scenario. 
Furthermore, since Scheduled Bundle supports all OpenFlow 
messages, we considered that utilizing Scheduled Bundle can 
gather statistics without relying on the performance of 
controller by time triggered OpenFlow messages execution. 
In this paper, we propose a novel approach to verify 
forwarding state consistency which uses the statistics 
gathered from switches at the same time by Scheduled Bundle. 
Our method can detect attacks by compromised switches 
without being influenced by the performance of controller 
statistics gathering. In addition, we evaluated this method by 
micro-benchmarking in an emulated minimal SDN 
environment implemented in Mininet. Our 
micro-benchmarking shows that our method can efficiently 
detect the attacks without depending on controller 
performance than SPHINX. 
II. RELATED WORK 
A. Software Defined Network 
Software Defined Network (SDN) decouples network 
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 control and packet forwarding function which enables flexible 
network control by the centralized control plane. Network 
intelligence is logically centralized in the trusted 
software-based controller that maintains a global view of the 
entire network, and packet forwarding function consists of 
hardware and software switches which are dumb forwarding 
device. 
OpenFlow [6] is a protocol to realize SDN using 
controllers and switches. OpenFlow messages relevant to this 
paper include FLOW_MOD, STATS_REPLY, and 
STATS_REQUEST. FLOW_MOD messages create flow 
entries in switches. STATS_REQUEST messages request the 
statistics to switches from a controller. As a response to 
STATS_REQUEST messages, STATS_REPLY messages 
report network statistics in switches about flow, table, and 
switch port, such as the number of packets and bytes sent or 
received. 
 
B. SDN and Time 
Scheduled Bundle proposed in Time4 [5] is a method to 
schedule the timing of some OpenFlow messages execution 
in switches and achieves without depending on the controller 
performance. Scheduled Bundle is a flexible method to be 
compatible with all types of OpenFlow messages. 
Furthermore, OpenFlow 1.5 specification [7] includes 
Scheduled Bundle. 
To execute scheduled messages simultaneously, Time4 
utilizes high precision time synchronization such as Precision 
Time Protocol (PTP) to be standardized by IEEE 1588 [8]. 
PTP can synchronize nanosecond order time synchronization 
by using hardware-timestamping enabled NIC module. Time4 
shows that updating flow at the same time can suppress 
packet loss and without depend on the performance 
degradation at Flow Swapping scenario. Additionally,  
T. Mizrahi et al. [5] reported 9 out of the 13 SDN capable 
switch silicones listed in the Open Networking Foundation 
(ONF) SDN Product Directory have native IEEE 1588 
support. 
 
C. SDN Security and Network Verification 
Several studies showed that SDN is more vulnerable to 
compromised switches than traditional networks [1], [2], [3]. 
To verify network configuration, several studies proposed 
such as VeriFlow [9] and NetPlumber [10]. However, these 
studies focus on the detection of network bugs such as loops 
but infringed switches are out of scope. Hence, 
countermeasures against compromised switches in SDN are 
required. 
SPHINX [2] is one of the countermeasures against 
compromised switches, and it assumes trusted controller and 
honest majority switches. SPHINX creates a global view of 
networks, called flow graph, by collecting FLOW_MOD 
messages from the trusted controller, and verifies its 
consistency and constraint. 
Moreover, SPHINX can verify the legitimacy of SDN data 
plane by byte consistency check with flow statistics gathered 
from switches. Byte consistency check uses  
Similarity Index (Σ), which is the moving average of byte 
statistics value regarding flow. Σ must be similar value as to a 
particular flow each switch when the networks do not suffer 
from attacks from compromised switches such as dropping or 
injecting packets. 
Byte consistency check is a practical approach to the 
countermeasure for attacks by compromised switches, but it 
has a scalability issue. Since it influenced by the gap of 
statistic gathering timing between each switch, the accuracy 
of SPHINX’s byte consistency check is controller 
performance dependent. In fact, several studies reported that 
controller performance depends on the number of connected 
switches [11] and the hardware specification [5]. Furthermore, 
A. Curtis et al. [12] showed that threshold-based and 
sampling-based statistics gathering method can gather 
statistics without depending on the controller performance. 
However, unfortunately, when these methods apply for data 
plane verification, it has an issue totally dependent on the 
timing of statistics report from untrusted switches. 
WedgeTail [3] has higher accuracy than SPHINX but also 
needs many resources due to gather packet hash and to verify 
behaviors of switches with comparing except and actual 
packet behaviors. 
Thus, current solutions have issues relating scalability such 
as the accuracy of verification may depend on controller 
performance. 
III. SYSTEM DESIGN 
A. Overview 
As mentioned in Section II, the existing solutions have 
scalability issues such as depends on controller performance, 
needs many resources. Hence, if the number of switches 
increase and a controller specification is insufficient, the 
accuracy of verification may decrease. 
In this paper, we propose a data plane verification method 
which uses the statistics gathered at the same time between all 
switches by accurate time scheduling. Our method enables 
collecting statistics without depending on the controller 
performance, and the controller can handle statistics gathering 
simultaneously. 
Fig. 1 presents a schematic architecture of the system 
 






 assumed in this paper. The part implemented by the proposed 
method is indicated by Verifier in this figure, and it intercepts 
OpenFlow messages between the switches and the controller 
applications. Furthermore, we assume that all the switches 
and all the controllers are accurately time synchronized. 
 
B. Threat Model 
We focus on data plane security that attacks can detect 
from packet transfer statistics analysis as control plane 
security is well studied [13]. We assume that a compromised 
switch may drop, inject, or delay packets, and it does not 
handle the packets according to the rules specified by the 
controller correctly. The cause of these behaviors may be 
misconfiguration or switch failure. Our method can be 
utilized not only to detect compromised switch behaviors but 
also to discover network defects. As with the assumption of 
SPHINX, we assume that the controller applications are 
trusted and majority of switches are legitimate. In other words, 
messages from the controller are trusted, in contrast, 
messages from any switches may be forged by compromised 
switches. We consider that the verifier knows reliable 
physical topology information, and assume closed SDN 
system, since to focus analysis on only OpenFlow control 
messages. 
Additionally, we assume that the time of all switches and 
the controller are synchronized accurately by time 
synchronization protocol such as PTP. Even if a compromised 
switches synchronized the time like legitimate switches and 
disguise the byte transfer statistics, many other switches 
report legitimate statistics. Consequently, since the difference 
of byte transfer statistics arises compared with the 
compromised switches and many legitimate switches, our 
method can detect attacks by compromised switches (See 
Section III-C3). Additionally, for the countermeasure of 
attacks to PTP protocol, we can utilize prior art such as [14]. 
Therefore, the security of time synchronization is out of scope 
in this paper. 
 
C. Sequence of Validation 
Fig. 2 shows the workflow of our method, which involves 
three sequences. Our method validates whether the packet 
transmissions correctly performed on the path, which 
supposes by the trusted controller. The sequence of validation 
to specific traffic flow by our method is the following: 
1)  Calculate the path that the controller supposes, using 
physical topology information and FLOW_MOD 
messages which send from the controller application. 
2)  Get actual transfer statistics of all switches at the same 
time by using Scheduled Bundle. 
3)  Validate transfer state consistency using the expected 
path by the controller, and difference of statistics 
between neighbor switches. 
As described in Section III-A, our method intercepts 
OpenFlow message, such as FLOW_MOD message and 
STATS_REPLY messages, then relay to the destination. Our 
method also relays OpenFlow messages which does not 
relevant to the verification. 
In Section III-C1 through Section III-C3, we present these 
mechanisms in detail. 
 
1) Calculate Current Path 
Our method needs to construct a flow graph, which is a 
graph theoretic represent of network assumed by a trusted 
controller, to obtain a current path, similar to SPHINX. The 
flow graph constructs only using FLOW_MOD messages 
issued by the trusted controller. It includes match field and 
instruction, which contains src/dst MAC address, src/dst IP 
address, and in/out port information of the switches. The flow 
graph is not suffering from untrusted switches since untrusted 
STATS_REPLY messages do not use in constructing flow 
graph. 
The current path assumed by the trusted controller can 
obtain by combinations of the information of FLOW_MOD 
messages and physical topology information. The current 
path uses for identifying the switches through which specific 
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 2) Statistics Gathering with Scheduled Bundle 
Our method gathers transfer statistics from switches at the 
same time periodically. In general, when statistic gathering, a 
controller sends STATS_REQUEST messages periodically, 
and its timing depends on the controller performance. On the 
other hand, our method uses STATS_REQUEST wrapped by 
Scheduled Bundle, since it gathers statistics between each 
switch simultaneously. It can gather statistics without 
depending on controller performance. 
Fig. 3 illustrates a flow of gathering transfer statistics at 
timestamp TS with Scheduled Bundle. First, the controller 
sends BUNDLE_OPEN message to the switch, followed by 
BUNDLE_ADD message which encapsulating 
STATS_REQUEST message to gather statistics for all flow 
entries. Finally, the controller sends BUNDLE_COMMIT 
message with the timestamp of schedule execution timing TS. 
To verify byte consistency, our method mainly uses 
byte_cnt and match field information that contained in 
STATS_REPLY messages. Our method associates flow and 
statistics according to match field, and calculate byte_cnt 
difference from already collected STATS_REPLY 
information. 
The difference of statistics between the switches may occur 
by the timing of FLOW_MOD message send by the controller 
application depends on the mechanism of routing control. 
Additionally, the statistics of simultaneity gathering also 
depends on the performance of the switches, such as the size 
of flow table and the accuracy of schedule execution. Thus, 
our method uses moving averages of the difference last four 
statistics report (i.e. use byte_cnt difference) at the same time 
between each switch, called ByteDiff. Since this interval is 
sufficient to eliminate the effects of scheduling errors and 
traffic bursts, our mechanism can avoid false alarms. In 
comparison with SPHINX’s Σ, since the scheduling 
mechanism gathers the statistics simultaneously, ByteDiff of 
our method does not depend on the controller performance. 
 
3) Algorithm 
Algorithm 1 describes the step of executing the consistency 
check by a given flow graph and gathered statistics between 
switches simultaneously. The algorithm needs the flow graph 
as input, and the flow graph includes a current path relevant 
to traffic flow F. Our method verifies whether compromised 
switches attack the network from the same two points as 
SPHINX. 
Firstly, this algorithm validates the statistics of switches 
over a current path of traffic flow F, in order from the nearest 
switch from a source host. Since the algorithm uses the 
statistics gathered at the same time, all the switches that 
passed through must report the similar value of the statistics 
between the switches. Thus, even if a compromised switch 
disguises that the statistics are similar to an honest switch, it 
can be detected by the honest downstream switch. 
The algorithm needs considering the difference of the 
statistics values which occurs by propagation delay, 
scheduling error, and the difference of flow table size 
maintaining by the switches. For that reason, it compares the 
statistics of neighbor switches based on the statistics of the 
validation already passed switches, called PrevByte, using a 
threshold τ. The algorithm reports a violation if it observes 
much different from the simultaneous statistics of the 
neighbor switch over the current path. 
Secondly, the algorithm verifies whether the statistics of 
switches, that are not included in the current path associated 
with traffic flow F, are zero. In this way, it can verify that no 
traffic has been injected and dropped by the switches that are 
out of the current path. 
The algorithm needs the threshold (τ) as an input, which is 
used as the margin of the statistics value similarity. To 
consider ByteDiff varied with communication situation, the 
algorithm calculates a maximum/minimum ByteDiff with 
multiplying PrevByte by the threshold. Additionally, since the 
performance of statistics gathering depends on the switch 
performance, which occurs from the accuracy of schedule 
execution, the flow table size [12], and the implementation of 
the switch [15], τ needs to be determined in consideration of 
the switch performance. In this algorithm, if the value of τ is 
too large, false negatives may occur and a genuine alarm may 
not be outputted. On the other hand, If the value of τ is too 
small, the algorithm can cause false positives. Therefore, the 






























Controller Algorithm 1 Proposal algorithm
Input: F :traffic flow, ⌧ :threshold
Output: O:violation switches of traffic flowF
function Verify(F ,⌧)
Initialize:




for all S 2 CurrP do
FE := Get_FlowEntry(S,F )
ByteDiff := Get_ByteStatsDifference(FE)
if True == ((PrevByte == 1) _
(PrevByte/⌧ < ByteDiff < PrevByte·⌧)) then
PrevByte := ByteDiff
else
O := O [ S
for all S 2 FG ^ S 62 CurrP do
FE := Get_FlowEntry(S,F )
ByteDiff := Get_ByteStatsDifference(FE)
if ByteDiff 6= 0 then
O := O [ S
35
 IV. EVALUATION 
A. Experiment Setup 
1) Implementation 
We suppose our method to integrate into an application of 
the controller. However, since we consider the effect of 
processing for this experiment, we implemented our method 
as a proxy between the controller application and the switches, 
separately from the controller application. We implemented it 
in Stopcock [16], which is an implementation of OpenFlow 
proxy, and we used custom Loxigen [17] script to achieve 
compatibility with Scheduled Bundle. We used the OpenFlow 
switch called ofsoftswitch13_EXT-340 [18], which 
compatible with Scheduled Bundle. 
We determined that the interval of the statistics gathering is 
three seconds and the time of executing schedule is after one 
second at the first BUNDLE_OPEN message sent. Since 
ofsoftswitch13_EXT-340 is not supported multiple 
scheduling, these intervals are sufficient value to eliminate 
the duplicated schedule. 
 
2) Experiment Environment 
We evaluated our prototype by micro-benchmarking on an 
emulated network with Mininet [19]. Our testbed emulates 
the network on a single machine, and each node refers to the 
same hardware clock. Thus, we can assume that the time of 
each emulated node is synchronized. Although time 
synchronization emulation with perfect precision is 
impossible due to resource conflict, it is sufficient accuracy 
for out method to use statistical average to reduce 
performance attributes. Fig. 4 shows that emulated topology 
in our testbed by using Mininet (linear, k = 3, n = 1). The 
verification program placed on the same host as running 
Mininet to emulate time synchronization. To mitigate the 
impact of resource conflicting, we used minimal topology and 
separated the controller application host and the Mininet host 
including the verification program. We hosted the emulated 
network and the verification program on a machine equipped 
with Intel Xeon E3-1220v5, 3.00GHz, quad-core and 32GB 
RAM. We used Floodlight v1.1 [20] as the SDN controller 
application, and it hosted on a machine with Intel Core i5, 
3.10GHz, quad-core and 8GB RAM. 
3) Scheduling Accuracy 
We measured the accuracy of scheduling to show the 
adequacy of using emulated testbed. Fig. 5 shows the results 
of experiments measuring the accuracy of scheduling in the 
testbed. In this experiment, we measured the difference 
between actual execution time and scheduled execution time, 
by sending 1K Scheduled Bundle from the verification 
program every three seconds to each switch. The switches 
also put a load on by generating traffic from h1 to h3. The 
scheduling error depends on the processing power of the 
machine, and the frequency of resource confliction. Therefore, 
the scheduling error of s3 is larger than others. We observed 
that the scheduling error of our testbed is less than 0.3 
millisecond in the 90 percentiles at all switches. From this 
result, we confirmed that this environment is sufficient to 
evaluate our method, since our method can mitigate the 
scheduling error with using moving average. 
 
B. Accuracy of Verification 
We evaluated the accuracy of the verification in the 3-hop 
path which uses TCP flows from h1 to h3 with iperf. We 
executed verifications with SPHINX and our method and 
compared the accuracy of the verification. Since our testbed 
is a minimal configuration, we simulated the variation of the 
controller performance by delay (d), which inserts before 
sending STATS_REQUEST from the verification program. In 
fact, Tootoonchain et al. [11] reported that as increasing the 
number of connected switches cause I/O handling overhead 
and resource contention on the task, the latency of controller 
response increase. 
 
1) False alarm 
We analyzed the probability of false alarm caused by the 
impact of the controller performance degradation. In this 
experiment, it is not preferable to raise an alarm in 
verification because all switches are legitimate. 
Fig. 6a and Fig. 6b illustrate false-positive rate in SPHINX 
and our method. We observed that SPHINX increases false 
alarms evidently when the controller performance occurs 
degradation (i.e. d become increasing), as it depends on the 
controller performance. In contrast, we observed that even if 
d increase, the false positive rate of our method is without 
increasing, it similar to SPHINX at d = 0. 
 
2) Lack of genuine alarm 
We evaluated the probability of the lack of genuine alarm 
given the variety of the controller performance using the same 
 
Fig. 4: Microbenchmark topology. 
 
 


























 conditions, and compared each method. We performed packet 
drop on a link of between s2 to s3 by given link loss rates, 
such as 2%, 4%, and 6%, to emulate malicious behaviors by 
compromised switch or link. In this experiment, although it is 
preferable that alarms are generated in all verifications, false 
negatives may occur when τ increases. 
Fig. 6c through Fig. 6e illustrate false-negative rates of 
each method at the three kinds of controller performance 
value d (d = 0, 5, 10). We observed that the false negative rate 
of our method is slightly higher than SPHINX when d 
increases. However, our method can set small τ than SPHINX 
(see Section IV-B1). Thus, our method can achieve the 
performance of the false-negative rate equivalent to SPHINX 
by tuning τ. 
 
C. Overheads 
We measured the overhead of statistics gathering from 
switches with SPHINX and our method. We measured the 
ping latencies between h1 to h3 while gather statistics every 
three seconds. Fig. 6f shows the result of this experiment. We 
observed that the ping latencies of our method are partly 
higher than SPHINX, since the implementation of Scheduled 





Our method has a few following limitations that similar to 
SPHINX. 
• Our method cannot identify ingress or egress switch is 
compromised or not since it depends on STATS_REPLY 
messages from untrusted switches. Thus, if the edge 
switch is compromised, our method cannot detect the 
attack even if the switch that passes through after is 
legitimate. Therefore, our method cannot apply to 
End-to-End verification currently. However, it is 
possible to detect attacks from compromised switches by 
managing all the hosts by the verifier as well as the 
switches, and enabling the gathering of statistics from 
the hosts at the scheduled time. 
• Our method may miss some transient attack since the 
span of verification depends on the verification program. 
To fix this limitation, it is necessary to shorten the 
statistics gathering interval or change to a highly 
accurate network monitoring method such as WedgeTail. 
• Our method cannot verify traffic integrity. To overcome 
the issue, cryptographic mechanisms can support it. 
 
B. Future Work 
We need further experiments which evaluate the scalability, 
the overhead and the accuracy in a real-world environment 
which is synchronized time accurately. Additionally, we plan 
to reduce the statistics gathering overhead of Scheduled 
Bundle by periodic scheduling, since our current prototype 
sends Scheduled Bundle every timing of statistics gathering. 
Additionally, the compatibility of our method with 
distributed controller environment such as ONOS [21] is 
required further investigation. Even if these sites manage 
separately, it is possible to synchronize the time of all the 
  
 
(a) SPHINX’s false-positive rate with variation 




(b) Our method’s false-positive rate with 




(c) Comparison of false-negative rate at d = 0 




(d) Comparison of false-negative rate at d = 5 




(c) Comparison of false-negative rate at d = 10 




(f) Comparison of our method’s and  
SPHINX’s ping latencies. 
 
 
Fig. 6: Experiment results. 
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 switches and the controllers with sufficiently high precision 
by utilizing time synchronization method such as PTP. Thus, 
we believe that improved our method is suitable for 
distributed controller environment. However, since 
distributed controller environment may have link delays 
caused by the distances between sites, we plan to improve the 
method to consider a link specific delay. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Software Defined Network (SDN) is attracting rising 
attention as a future networking paradigm. However, although 
SDN security such as control plane well studied, the attacks 
on data plane by compromised switches can be a more serious 
threat. Unfortunately, existing solutions have some issues 
relevant to scalability such as increasing false alarm rely on 
controller performance. This paper showed that the first step 
to a countermeasure against compromised switches by 
utilizing to gather statistics with the timing schedule. By 
gathering statistics simultaneously from the switches by 
scheduling, our method can detect attacks by compromised 
switches without depending on the controller performance. 
Additionally, our method considered that the difference of 
statistics which occurs from scheduling error. From the 
results of the experiments, we confirmed that the false 
positive rate of our method is lower than SPHINX even if the 
controller performance decrease. 
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